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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-'"SEX

DISCRIMINATION" UNDER TITLE VII INCLUDES

DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF PREGNANCY
RELATED DISABILITIES
Public Law 95-5551
In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Congress expressly made
it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate on
the basis of sex. 2 Since then, employers, legal scholars, and the courts have
struggled in attempts to define sex discrimination as it relates to pregnancy. 3 Frequently the definitional problem arose in sex discrimination
challenges to employment disability programs which excluded pregnancy related disabilities. One such challenge was General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,4
in which the Supreme Court held that differential treatment of pregnancy
by denying benefits to pregnant women in an otherwise comprehensive
disability plan did not constitute sex discrimination. In response to Gilbert,
Congress enacted Public Law 95-5555 which expands the definition of sex
discrimination under Title VII to include differential treatment "because

1. Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment-Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (partially codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (k)
(West Supp. 1974-1978) (signed into law October 31, 1978)).
2. The specific provision is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1976), which
reads:.
It. shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or,
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.
3. For a discussion of judicial treatment of gender-unique characteristics
other than pregnancy, see Callis, Minimum Height and Weight Requirements
As a Form of Sex Discrimination,25 LAB. L.J. 736 (1974); Comment, Long Hair
and the Law: A Look at Constitutional and Title VII Challenges to Public and
Private Regulation of Male Grooming, 24 KAN. L. Rxv. 143 (1975).
4. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
5. H.R. Rur. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nxws 4749, 4753; S.RaP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
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of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions." 6
Thus, Congress expressly made discrimination because of, or on the basis
of, pregnancy an unlawful employment practice for employers who are
covered by the provisions of Title VII.7
The definitional clarification resolves many of the controversial questions regarding sex discrimination as it relates to pregnancy -disability. At
the same time, Xhe Act raises questions as to the interrelationship between
resolving, pregnancy based sex discrimination challenges under Title VII
and under the equal protection 'clause. While the Act expands the definition of prohibited sex discrimination under Title VII, sex discrimination
under the equal protection clause is presumably unaffected. It is clear that
treatment of the new provision"by the-Supreme Court in decisions involving Title VII and constitutional sex discrimination challenges could significantly.influence the- effettiveness of the: expanded definition by allowing women to. overcome the effect ,of differential treatment of -pregnancy
by. employers: The pro.visions of Public Law 95-555 and its implications
will be examined in.this note.
Although the definitional change was enacted as a reaction to judicial
treatment of employer disability and insurance programs that excluded
pregnancy, it has broader ramifications. It not only has the effect of- requiring pregnancy to be treated. as any other disabilities under fringe
benefit programs, but also prohibits terminating or refusing to hire or
promote a woman simply because she is pregnant, bars mandatory leave for
pregnant women based on factors other than their ability to work, protects the reinstatement rights of women on leave for pregnancy, and requires that women be given credit for previous service, accrued retirement
benefits, and accumulated seniority when they return to work from preg6. The Act proi;ides in part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because 6f- or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical 'conditions, shall be treated the same for all- employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other, persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (k) (West Supp. 1974-1978).
7. For purposes of Title VII, "employer" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b)
(1976), as a person "engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person."
Since the new provision expands the reach of sex discrimination under Title VII,
rather than creating a new type 'of-discrimination action, traditional lro'edural
and remedial provisibns will apply to actions challenging differential- treatment
of pregnancy'by employers under the Act. The provisions are set but in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (g) (1976). They allow a *court to "enjoin the respondent from- engaging
in unlawful employrient practice, and order such affirmative action' as may be
appropriate." Relief in appropriate situations can include "reinstatemdnt of an
employee and also payinent of back pay that is due. Id." See also Albermarle
Paper Co. . Moody, 422: U.S. 405 (1975) (damages recoverable for Title VII
discrimination).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss1/12

2

t980]

LEGISLATIVE NOTE
Harpool: Harpool: Employment Disrimination-Sex Discrimination

nancy leave..'An exception to the definition allows employers to avoid
paying. health, insurance.benefits for abortions except where the life of
the mother would be endangered -if the baby were carried to tern.9 The
Act,- however, does not prohibit employers from paying for non-therapeutic
abortions, and an employer with a disability or medical insurance plan
must include coverage for complications which arise from an' aboition,
whether -or not the abortion was covered. 10
It is important, to note that Public Law 95-555, enacted as an amendment to the" definitional subchapter of Title VII, does not mandate that
an employer provide for" employees a disability or other fringe beriefit
program.: It only requires that if such a program is provided, it musi be
nondiscriminatory with regard to pregnancy. -Where.' benefit programs are
provided, .the 'House and Senate reports clearly indicate that an-employer
can require- that women be examined by a physician before being declared
disabled because of 'pregnancy. In essence, the test for pregnancy disability
is the same. as that applied to other forms of disability: the employee is
unable to work."1
Employers are given a six month grace period in which to put disability and insurance programs into compliance with the Act. 12 However,
the Act, as it applies to hiring, firing, and mandatory leaves, became effective on enactment. 13 Employers are prohibited from reducing benefits
8. 8 aB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Employment Practices Manual ir 421:601
(1979). Prior to enactment of Public Law 95-555, denial of accumulated seniority
to an employee forced to take leave of absence because of pregnancy was declared.to be sex discrimination under Title VII in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. 136 (1977), Mandatory leave requirements for pregnant employees not related to their ability to work were held to be sex discrimination under the equal
protection clause in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).

9. The abortion exclusion was the product of political maneuvering between pro and anti-abortion forces. The original House bill contained the exclusion; the original Senate bill did not. The exclusion was designed to assure
the right of employees to refuse to pay for abortion when it is contrary to their
religious beliefs. As passed, however, employers cannot refuse to hire applicants
because they have exercised their right to have an abortion. H.R. REP. No. 948,
supra note 5, at 7, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4755, and
the dissenting views of Mr. Weiss at 15, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONXG. &
AD. NEws at 4761; S. REP. No. 381, supra note 5, at 12, and the supplemental
views of Senator Eagleton at 17.
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (k) (West Supp. 1974-1978).
11. H.R, REP. No. 948, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S, -CODE
C.ONG. & Ai. NEWS at 4753; S. REP. No. 331, supra note 5, at 4.
12. Section 2 of the Act reads:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the amendment made by this
Act shall be effective on the date of enactment.
(b) The provisions of the amendment made by the first section of thi3
Act shall not apply to any fringe benefit program or fund, or insurance
program, which is in effect on the date of enactment of this Act 'until
180 days after enactment of this Act.
Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment-Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 95-

555 § 2, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
13. Id.
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to comply with the definitional change for a period of one year,' 4 but the
Act has no provision regarding benefit reductions after the one year period;
presumably reductions after one year would be permissible. The reports
of the congressional committees raise doubts as to the propriety of such
reductions. 5
Passage of the definitional clarification by Congress indicates disagreement between the judicial and legislative branches in their perceptions of the meaning of "sex discrimination" as it applies to pregnancy. The
Supreme Court has rejected the contention that differential treatment of
pregnancy in disability programs constitutes sex discrimination under
Title VII1 6 or the equal protection dause. 17 Congress, on the other hand,
adopted Public Law 95-555 with a clear intent that differential treatment
of pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII. The reports
of the congressional committees make it clear that those committees consider the Supreme Court to have misconstrued the original purpose and
meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII, and that the new definition
was perceived to "reflect no new legislative mandate nor effect changes
in practices, costs, or benefits beyond those intended by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act."' 8 A review of the Supreme Court's recent treatment of
14. Section 3 of the Acts reads in part:
Until the expiration of a period of one year from the date of enactment
of this Act or, if there is an applicable collective-bargaining agreement in
effect on the date of enactment of this Act, until the termination of
that agreement, no person . . . shall, in order to come into compliance

with this Act, reduce the benefits or the compensation provided any
employee.. . : Provided, That where the costs of such benefits on the
date of enactment of this Act are apportioned between employers and
employees, the payments or contributions required to comply with this Act
may be made by employers and employees in the same proportion; And
provided further, That nothing in this section shall prevent the readjustment of benefits or compensation for reasons unrelated to compliance
with this Act.

Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment-Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
95-555 § 3, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
15. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 5, at 9, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CoDu
CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4757 states: "It must be emphasized . . . that the one
year limitation . . . must not be construed as permission for employers who do

not comply immediately to reduce benefits because of the bill simply because
the time limit period has run." S. REP. No. 331, supra note 5, at 8, indicates the
one-year period is included to prevent the bill from interfering with the
"legitimate expectation of employees as regards their current fringe benefit
coverage, or result[ing] in instability in labor-management relations." It would
seem that an employer could, therefore, reduce benefits after expiration of the oneyear period as long as the reduction did not interfere with the legitimate expectations of employees under existing programs.
16. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
17. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
18. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 5, at 34, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CoDx
CONG. & AD. Naxvs at 4751-52. The report also declares that "[t]he Supreme
Courts narrow interpretations of Title VII tend to erode our national policy
of nondiscrimination in employment." Id. at 3, reprinted in,[1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. Sc AD. NEws at 4752. See also S. REP. No. 331, supra note 5, at 2-3.
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disability and insurance plans that exclude pregnancy will reveal the basis
of the differing legislative and judicial views.
In Geduldig v. Aiello,1 9 the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection
challenge to a California unemployment insurance program that excluded
pregnancy. The Court declared, in frequently discussed "footnote 20," that
the program did "not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of
gender, but merely remove[dJ one physical condition-pregnancy-from the
list of compensible disabilities." 20 Two years later, the Court adhered closely
to this language in rejecting a Title VII challenge to General Electric's disability plan in General Electric v. Gilbert.21 Although Geduldig was decided on equal protection grounds, the Court borrowed language from that
decision when it observed in Gilbert that "[t]here is no risk from which
men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from
which women are protected and men are not."2

2

The Court considered

sex discrimination under Title VII to be closely related to sex discrimina23
tion under the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court later, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 24 held that
the denial of accumulated seniority to a female worker forced to take leave
from, employment because of pregnancy constituted sex discrimination
under Title VII. It had reached a similar decision a few years earlier under

19. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
20., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). For discussions of
"footnote 20," see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetr.el

v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975); Berg v. Richmond Unified
School Dist., 528 F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1975); Larson, Sex Discrimination as to Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKE L.J. 805; Comment, Pregnancy and Employment
Benefits, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 767 (1975); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classificationand the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. Rv.
441 (1975); Note, Exclusion of Pregnancy from Coverage of Disability Benefits
Does Not Violate Equal Protection, 12 Hous. L. REv. 488 (1975); Note, Sex
Discritnination in Employment Fringe Benefits, 17 WM. & MARY L. Rlv. 109
(1975).

21. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
22. Id. at 138.
23. A number of courts of appeals decisions had refused to rely on Geduldig
as authority in Title VII actions since that case was decided on equal protection
grounds. See, e.g., cases cited note 20 supra. In Gilbert, the Supreme Court took
the opposite view:
While there is no necessary inference that Congress . . . intended to
-incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which have
evolved from the court decisions construing the Equal Protection
Clause. ... the similarities between the congressional language and some
of those decisions surely indicate that the latter are a useful starting
point in interpreting the former.... We think, therefore, that our decision in Geduldig v. Aiello . .. is quite relevant in determining whether
or not the pregnancy exclusion did discriminate on the basis of sex.
429 U.S. at 13a.
24. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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the equal protection clause. 25 The Court indicated, however, that denial
of sick pay to a pregnant worker was "legally indistinguishable from the
disability program upheld in Gilbert."26 The Court distinguished accumulated seniority from disability and sick pay coverage, and found a significant
difference between conduct that imposes a burden on women not imposed on men (denied seniority) and conduct that merely denies women
a benefit that men cannot receive (disability and sick pay coverage for
pregnancy disability). The distinction between the denial of benefits and
the imposition of a burden, the Court claimed, "is more than one of
semantics,"27 but nevertheless provided no guidance in determining the
boundaries of the distinction.
It appears that under the new Act employers covered by the provisions of Title VII will be effectively prohibited from discriminating
against pregnancy. However, employers not covered by the provisions of
Title VI128 and not subject to contrary state laws 29 would seem to be able
to continue to treat pregnancy differently than other disabilities.
In some instances the equal protection clause may provide relief to
pregnant employees subjected to differential treatment. Whether relief
will be 'available will depend on the effect, if any, that the new definition
has on judicial treatment of sex discrimination as it relates to pregnancy
under the equal protection clause. Since the Supreme Court has traditionally treated sex discrimination as it relates to pregnancy similarly under
both the equal protection clause and Title VII, 30 relief might be available
in circumstances similar to those where relief is available under the new
law and the requirements of state action are met.3 1 More likely, however,

25. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the Court
held that mandatory leave requirements for pregnant employees not. based on
their ability to work constituted sex discrimination under the equal protection
clause. See note 8 supra,
26. Nashville Gas. Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977).
27. Id. at 142. See H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws at 4751, for a discussion of the semantic problems

involved in distinguishing burdens from benefits.
28. See note 7 supra.
29. At least 22 states have employment discrimination laws that. prohibit

differential treatment of pregnancy disability by employers. These laws take -the

form of express statutory provisions and judicial and agency interpretation of
state statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. H.R. REP. No.:948,
supra note 5, at 11, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nxws. at..4759;

S. REP. No. 331, supra note 5,,at 3. In Missouri, employment laws havre been interpreted by state enforcement agencies to require equal treatment of a. preg-

nant worker. H.R. RFP. No. 948, supra note 5, at 11, reprinted in [1978]. U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.. NEwS at 4759.
30. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
31. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (discussing the
requirements of state action); Monell v. Department of Social Servs.; 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (discussing the requirements of a sex discrimination claim based on

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
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the Court will retain traditional sex discrimination definitions in regard
32
to pregnancy.
The report of the Senate Human Resources Committee suggests that
female dependents of male employees need not be treated similarly to
female employees. 38 The Act was designed to help women employees, overcome the barrier that differential treatment of pregnancy creates in employment; the report indicates that the question of proper treatment of
pregnant dependents of male employees, where male dependents of female
employees are provided comprehensive disability coverage, is left to "existing title VII principles." 3 4 The quoted language could be found by the
Court to suggest the application of the Nashville Gas benefit/burden test.
If so held, differential treatment of pregnancy in employee-dependent
benefit plans would be permissible because Nashville Gas upheld the
equivalent treatment of women employees. Based on the language in the
report, it is also possible that the Court would hold that the new defirtition
applies only where employees themselves are concerned and -that the
definition's effect on employee-dependent benefits need not be considered.
A literal reading of the Act indicates that the crucial consideration is
whether pregnancy is treated differently than other disabilities by* employers, and not whether employees themselves as opposed to their dependents are concerned. This would seem to indicate that the exclusion
of pregnancy from dependent benefits would constitute differential treatment by an employer "because of or on the basis of pregnancy," and thus
be unlawful.
An extremely narrow interpretation of the Act might not only allow
exclusion of employee dependents from its coverage, but also significantly
curtail its impact on the benefits accorded employees. Past treatments of
pregnancy based sex discrimination claims under Title VII and the equal
32. The Court has generally treated sex discrimination under Title VII and
the equal protection clause similarly. See note 23 supra. Therefore, it could be
that relief under the equal protection clause will be available where the treatment challenged is considered a burden under the Nashville Gas Co., benefits!
burdens test applied to Title VII actions. See text accompanying notes 24, 26 k27 supra. For challenges to differential treatment of pregnancy brought, under
the equal protection clase, see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). See also notes 19, 20 & 25.supra.
33. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 5, at 6, indicates that the bill "wquld. not
mandate that women dependents be compared with women employees."
34. Id. The report also stated:
Presumably because plans which provide comprehensive medical coverage
for spouses of women employees but not spouses of male employees are
rare, we are not aware of any title VII litigation concerning such plans.
It is certainly not this committee's desire to encourage the institution of
such plans. If such plans should be instituted in the future, the question
would remain whether, under title VII, the affected employees were
discriminated against on the basis of sex as regards the extent of coverage for their dependents.
Id. For Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines referring to
employer, treatment of dependents under fringe benefit programs, see 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1604.9(b), (c), (e) and 800.116(d) (1978).
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protection clause have focused consideration on the effects of the disparate
treatment of women. 35 The evaluation, however, has been limited to comparing the dollar value of benefits actually accruing to women under the
plan to the value of those accruing to men. Both the Gilbert and Geduldig
decisions emphasized that the dollar values of the disability plans accruing
to women were greater than those accruing to men, even though pregnancy
was excluded from coverage.3 6 In telling language, the Gilbert Court concluded that, "As there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more
to men than women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect."3 7 In Gilbert the Court went on to conclude that, under Title
VII, it would not be improper for an employer to dissolve fringe benefit
programs and replace them with increased wages to each employee in
the amount of the cost of existing benefit coverage. 38 The Court stated:
[T]here would clearly be no gender-based discrimination, even
though a female employee who wished to purchase disability insurance that covered all risks would have to pay more than would
a male employee who purchased identical disability insurance,
due to the fact that her insurance had to cover the 'extra' disabilities due to pregnancy. 39
If disability insurance were replaced with equivalent wages, Public Law
95-555 would apparently present no obstacle; collective bargaining agreements40 and the Equal Pay Act, 41 however, might present obstacles. Addi35. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1977); General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-38 (1976); Geduldig v. AielIo, 417 U.S. 484, 49697 (1974).
36. In Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 130-31 n.9, the value of the benefits accruing to
male and female employees was provided in tabular form. Female employees had
a significantly greater claim rate per 1,000 employees in both 1970 and 1971
under the General Electric plan even though pregnancy was not covered. The
cost per insured employee was also higher for female employees than male employees in both years. In Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.21, similar statistics were
found "under the California plan. Further, "[s]everal amici curiae . . . represented to the court that they have had a similar experience under private disability insurance programs." Id. See also Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Pro-

tection-Exclusion of Pregnancy-Related Disabilities for State Salary Com ensation Insurance Program Denies Equal Protection to Pregnant Employees, 27
L. REv. 551 (1974). There is some disagreement as to whether the statistics
indicate a disproportionate consumption of benefits by women or just variances
based on the low contribution rate of women in low paying jobs. See Comment,
VAND.

Waiting for the Other Shoe-Wetzel and Gilbert in the Supreme Court, 25 EMORY"
L.J. 125 (1976).
37. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976).
38. Id. at 139 n.17.

39. Id.
40. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1976) reads in part:

No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate .. .between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees
'of the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equ~il skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions ....
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tionally, increasing wages could serve to bypass only some of the area of differential treatment of pregnancy. Seniority, reinstatement, sick leave, and
vacation benefits, if discriminatorily awarded on the basis of pregnancy,
would still be violative of the Act.
Employers might further limit the impact of the new law by structuring a plan for disability benefits, or for that matter any benefits, which
although not specifically mentioning pregnancy provides coverage which as
a practical matter will confer only minimal benefits-and thus incur minimal expense to the employer-on account of pregnancy. Such a plan, even
though facially neutral, might be subject to attack if proven to disparately
award benefits to males over females and found to be a sham to disguise
42
employer discriminatory intent.
In essence, the new Act has one effect. It legislatively reverses the
judicial determination that pregnancy is not a sex based attribute; under
the Act and Title VII, a pregnancy based classification is now without
doubt a sex based one. Judicial energy in application of the new definition,
and the extent to which it influences future consideration of pregnancy
classification cases under the equal protection clause, will significantly
influence the development of this area of employment discrimination law.
M.

DOUGLAS

HARPOOL

For possible exceptions to the Equal Pay Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (h) (1976)
which, by express provision of Public Law 95-555, is not to be treated as altering
or diminishing the effect of the new Act. For EEOC guidelines regarding equal
wages and fringe benefit programs, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.116 (d) and 1604.9 (b), (e)
(1978). See also S. REP. No. 331, supra note 5, at 7; H.R. REP. No. 948, supra
note 5, at 7, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nxws at 4755.
42. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401

U.S. 424 (1971).
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